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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After being charged with one count of felony domestic battery and one count of
misdemeanor resisting and/or obstructing an officer, Steven Jay exercised his constitutional right
to a jury trial.

Mr. Jay was alleged to have struck his long-time girlfriend, Keara Wilder.

Although she reported the conduct the night of the incident, by trial Ms. Wilder had recanted her
account that Mr. Jay struck her twice in the face. At trial, the prosecutor repeatedly told the jury
that Ms. Wilder was now lying; his frustration was evident throughout the trial, but was most
evident during his examination of Ms. Wilder and in his closing remarks to the jury. Mr. Jay
was found guilty as charged, and received an aggregate sentence of eight years, with three years
fixed, and the court retained jurisdiction.
On appeal, Mr. Jay contends that the district court erred by denying his motion for a
mistrial after the prosecutor impermissibly brought up I.R.E. 404(b) prior bad act information
during its impeachment of the alleged victim and committed multiple acts of prosecutorial
misconduct during closing statements in an attempt to secure a conviction. Mr. Jay asserts that
the prosecutor committed misconduct in multiple variations during closing statements by telling
the jury of his observations and opinions regarding domestic violence cases, and misrepresenting
and disparaging the defense's theory of the case. Although one instance of the misconduct was
not objected to, the error rises to the level of fundamental error. Mr. Jay respectfully requests
that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand his case for new trial.
Mr. Jay also contends that this sentence represents an abuse of the district court's
discretion, as it is excessive given any view of the facts.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On December 27, 2018, law enforcement went to the home of Steven Jay. (Trial Tr. Vol.
I, p.281, L.18 - p.282, L.2; State's Exh. 19.) Earlier that evening, Mr. Jay and his domestic
partner, Keara Wilder, got into an argument. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.18, Ls.13-14; p.40, Ls.13-18.)
The two began arguing while at their residence, the verbal disagreement turned physical, and
Ms. Wilder sustained injuries that she initially attributed to Mr. Jay. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.18,
Ls.1-20.) Ms. Wilder initially told law enforcement and medical care providers that Mr. Jay had
punched her twice in the face. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.307, L.22 - p.309, L.7; Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.7,
Ls.5-13; p.18, Ls.1-20; p.23, Ls.5-21.) Ms. Wilder had bruising to the left side of her face and a
fractured nasal bone. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.8, Ls.7-13; p.9, Ls.22-25.) Law enforcement woke
Mr. Jay up, spoke to him for approximately ten minutes, then advised him he was under arrest.
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.284, L.24 - p.285, L.10; p.286, Ls.4-6; State's Exh. 19.) Mr. Jay was
intoxicated and confused, as he still believed Ms. Wilder was in the house. (Trial Tr. Vol. I,
p.283, Ls.8-18; p.286, L.25 - p.287, L.8; p.329, Ls.4-9; p.334, Ls.5-16; p.48, L.16 - p.49, L.14.)
When officers began to handcuff him, he pulled his hand away. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.285, Ls.6-20;
p.330, L.7 - p.331, L.23; p.333, Ls.6-25.)
Based on these facts, the State filed an Information charging Mr. Jay with one count of
felony domestic battery and one count of misdemeanor resisting and/or obstructing an officer.
(R., pp.40-42.)
Mr. Jay exercised his constitutional right to a jury trial. During the prosecutor's opening
statements, he told the jury that Ms. Wilder reported that Mr. Jay struck her twice in the face that
night, but later told the prosecutor that she did not remember what happened; he anticipated that
she would testify at trial that she was intoxicated and unable to recall what had happened that
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night, and that she fell down. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.162, L.15 - p.163, L.20.) During trial, defense
counsel moved to exclude a portion of the officer's on-body camera in which the officers
suggested to Mr. Jay that he and Ms. Wilder argued "all the time," and said "this isn't anything
new." (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.172, L.17 - p.174, L.15.) Counsel noted that there had been no I.RE.
404(b) filing from the State; thus, it was his expectation that "no witness from here going
forward is going to state that there have been alleged prior incidences." (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.173,
Ls.2-7.) The motion was denied as the district court found that the statements were not referring
to specific past conduct, but were questions asked to ascertain whether these disagreements
between Mr. Jay and Ms. Wilder were a common occurrence. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.184, Ls.1-15.)
At trial, the State called Ms. Wilder, the alleged victim, to testify. Ms. Wilder testified
that she did not remember the incident, that she was very intoxicated that night, but that Mr. Jay
did not strike her. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.192, Ls.20-22; p.195, L.4-p.196, L.21; p.208, L.8 - p.211,
L.6; p.215, L.1 - p.216, L.4; p.246, Ls.6-18.) She testified that she hurt herself by slipping and
falling onto her car. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.259, L.8 - p.260, L.11.) To the prosecutor's frustration,
Ms. Wilder testified that she had fabricated the story about Mr. Jay hitting her. (Trial Tr. Vol. I,
p.261, Ls.18-22; p.261, L.23 - p.263, L.14.)
During its cross-examination of Ms. Wilder, defense counsel asked her whether she was
afraid of Mr. Jay. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.250, L.24 - p.251, L.1.) Ms. Wilder said, "He's no threat
to me. Never has been." (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.251, L.2.) During the prosecutor's re-direct
examination of Ms. Wilder, he confronted her on her testimony regarding the threat, and got her
to admit that she told the officers that she was scared of Mr. Jay that night. (Trial Tr. Vol. I,
p.265, Ls.1-21.) Several questions later, the prosecutor asked Ms. Wilder if she had told the
officers that night that "this wasn't the first time." (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.266, Ls.4-7.) He then
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asked her, "You told the officers that this was, what? The third or fourth time?" before defense
counsel objected. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.266, Ls.10-14.) The defense moved for a mistrial on the
basis that the prosecutor just introduced 404(b) evidence-"that there's an allegation that these
events occurred previously." (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.266, Ls.17-24.) The prosecutor claimed that the
defense "opened up that door" by asking Ms. Wilder whether she feared the defendant and her
response that he has never been any threat to her. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.266, L.24 - p.267, L.4.)
The district court denied the defense's motion for a mistrial. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.273, L.14 p.274, L.6.)
During his closing remarks to the jury, the prosecutor called on the jury to protect the
victim and the community by finding Mr. Jay guilty. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.134, Ls.3-10.) The
prosecutor also said, inter alia, in his rebuttal closing:
[Defense counsel] says it's unusual that they both testified it did not happen.
That's not unusual. Come down to the courthouse any time you want and watch
domestic violence cases and see how often a domestic violence victim takes the
stand and looks at the man who she has to live with and will probably live with
after and stares them in the eye and says, "Yeah, that's the man who beat me."
You come down and count how many of these victims you see.
No, it is not unusual for a victim to take that stand and deny everything that
happened and say that she just loves her spouse so much that she accidentally
tripped and hit her face on a countertop. Every Friday, down the hall.
What's unique about the case is that she made credible statements to a doctor and
a nurse who cared about her. And that's why we're here today. That's why this
case hasn't been dismissed.
(Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.133, L.12 -p.134, L.2.) Instead of calling a domestic violence expert during
his case-in-chief, the prosecutor essentially testified to the jury as if he were an expert in
domestic violence-specifically he told them that victims often deny that their spouse injured
them. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.133, Ls.12-23.) The prosecutor also disparaged the defense's theory
of the case, telling the jury that defense counsel's trial strategy was for the jury to "split the baby

4

King Solomon style."

(Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.136, L.14 - p.137, L.10.) The jury found Mr. Jay

guilty as charged. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.140, L.24 - p.141, L.12; R., p.131.)
At Mr. Jay's sentencing hearing, the State recommended a sentence of eight years, with
three years fixed. (9/3/19 Tr., p.18, Ls.19-23.) Mr. Jay's counsel asked the court to suspend
Mr. Jay's sentence and place him on probation. (9/3/19 Tr., p.21, Ls.1-12; p.24, L.22 - p.25,
L.2.) The district court then sentenced Mr. Jay to eight years, with three years fixed, on the
felony conviction, but retained jurisdiction.

(9/3/19 Tr., p.28, Ls.1-9; R., pp.149-57, 160-

67.) Mr. Jay was sentenced to one year for the misdemeanor resisting and/or obstructing an
officer conviction. (9/3/19 Tr., p.28, Ls.19-24; R., p.150.) The sentences were ordered to be
served concurrently. (R., p.150.)
Mr. Jay filed a Notice of Appeal timely from his judgment of conviction. (R., pp.170-75,
179-82.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Jay's motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor
brought up prohibited I.R.E. 404(b) evidence of prior bad acts?

II.

Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments by disparaging and
misrepresenting the defense?

III.

Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments by essentially
testifying to the jury as expert witness on domestic violence?

IV.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of eight
years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. Jay following his conviction for felony domestic
battery?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Jay's Motion For A Mistrial After The Prosecutor Told
The Jury Of Mr. Jay's Alleged Prior Bad Acts In The Guise Oflmpeaching Its Witness Under
I.R.E. 613
A.

Introduction
Mr. Jay asserts that district court committed reversible error by denying his motion for a

mistrial. After the prosecutor impeached Ms. Wilder, he then asked her to confirm that this had
happened before-"You told the officers that this was, what? The third or fourth time?" (Trial
Tr. Vol. I, p.266, Ls.10-11.) Thereafter, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's misconduct
and moved for a mistrial, which the district court denied, finding the defense had opened the
door by asking Ms. Wilder if she was afraid of Mr. Jay. The district court erred by denying
Mr. Jay's motion for a mistrial.

B.

Standard Of Review
Under Idaho Criminal Rule 29.l(a), "[a] mistrial may be declared," inter alia, ''upon

motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the
proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant. ..
." I.C.R. 29.l(a). The following standards are utilized when the denial of a motion for mistrial is
reviewed on appeal:
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised his
discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made.
Rather, the question must be whether the event which precipitated the motion for
mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record.
Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the "abuse
of discretion" standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is
one of reversible error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the
incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to declare a
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mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted
reversible error.
State v. Johnson, 163 Idaho 412, 421 (2018) (quoting State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908,

912 (2003). After a defendant shows a reversible error based on a contemporaneously objectedto, constitutionally-based error, "the State then has the burden of demonstrating to the appellate
court beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional violation did not contribute to the jury's
verdict." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010).

C.

The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Jay's Motion For A Mistrial Where The
Prosecutor Told The Jury Of Mr. Jay's Alleged Prior Bad Acts Under The Guise Of
Impeaching Its Witness Under I.R.E 613
When viewed in the context of the full record, the district court's refusal to declare a

mistrial after the prosecutor brought up the prohibited I.R.E. 404(b) prior bad acts of Mr. Jay
constituted reversible error. Although the prosecutor asked its witness about prior bad acts under
the rubric of impeaching the witness for making a prior inconsistent statement, I.R.E. 613, the
information was not proper impeachment where the witness had already admitted her trial
testimony was inconsistent with what she told the officers on the night of the incident. Thus, the
prosecutor's "impeachment" by revealing that Mr. Jay had "done this before" (prior incidents in
which he harmed the witness) was entirely unnecessary, and impeachment was simply a vehicle
to get this inadmissible information in front of the jury.
A witness's credibility can be impeached by any party, including the party that called the
witness. State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89, 103 (2014); I.R.E. 607. Under I.R.E. 613, a party may use
prior inconsistent out-of-court statements to impeach a witness. State v. Wood, 126 Idaho 241,
248 (Ct. App. 1994). These statements are not hearsay because "they are not offered for the truth
of any of the facts asserted, but rather, solely to impeach the credibility of the witness." Id. All
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evidence introduced under I.R.E. 613 must be relevant for the proper purpose of impeachment.

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 219 (2010); I.R.E. 401. Once the party seeking to admit the
evidence establishes relevance, the trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether such
evidence is admissible for impeachment purposes. Koch, 157 Idaho at 104. In Koch, the Idaho
Supreme Court adopted a standard which "allows the prior statement whenever a reasonable man
could infer on comparing the whole effect of the two statements that they had been produced by
inconsistent beliefs."

Id.

A district court nevertheless has the discretion to exclude such

evidence: "it is also true that 'trial judges must retain a high degree of discretion in deciding the
exact point at which a prior statement is sufficiently inconsistent with a witness's trial testimony
to permit its use in evidence."' Id.
During its cross-examination of Ms. Wilder, defense counsel asked her whether she was
afraid of Mr. Jay. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.250, L.24 - p.251, L.1.) Ms. Wilder said, "He's no threat
to me.

Never has been."

(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.251, L.2.)

During the prosecutor's re-direct

examination of Ms. Wilder, the following exchange occurred:
Q. You testified the Defendant has never -- your words -- never been a threat to
you?
A. He's never been a threat to me.
Q. That's not true, is it? You're scared ofhim?
A. No, I'm not.
Q. You told the officers you were scared of him.
A. At the time, I thought I was.
Q. You told the officers -- So you remember, at the time, being scared of him?
A. I thought I was, yes.
Q. Yeah. So on the night in question, you were actually scared of him?
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A. Yes.
Q. Huh. So you remember the fear you -A. Because I don't remember -Q. No. You had experienced -- you remember the fear you experienced that
night?
A. Very little, but, yes.
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.265, Ls.1-21.) Several questions later, the prosecutor re-initiated his earlier
line of questioning:
Q. You said you were scared of actually him hurting his kids.
A. I was intoxicated. I didn't know what I was saying at the time.
Q. You claim he has never been a threat to you twice now, and yet that night you
told the officers that this wasn't the first time, was it?
A. It's never happened. It's never happened.

Q. You told the officers that this was, what? The third or fourth time?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I'm going to object to this. Will you take
up my objection outside the presence of the jury?
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.265, L.25 - p.266, L.14.) The defense moved for a mistrial on the basis that
the prosecutor just introduced 404(b) evidence-"that there's an allegation that these events
occurred previously."

(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.266, Ls.17-24.)

The prosecutor claimed that the

defense "opened up that door" by asking Ms. Wilder whether she feared the defendant, and she
responded that she has never feared Mr. Jay-that he has never been any threat to her. (Trial
Tr. Vol. I, p.266, L.24 - p.267, L.4.)
Defense counsel asserted that a line had been crossed, extraordinary prejudice would
result from the prosecutor's comments, and the error could not be corrected through a curative
instruction. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.269, Ls.5-20.) Defense counsel argued that, instead of a jury

deciding whether a crime was committed, the jury is asked to decide whether a repeat offender
has previously committed a similar crime has repeated it. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.269, Ls.8-15.)
Defense counsel reminded the court that he asked Ms. Wilder whether she feared Mr. Jay today,
as she was testifying, meaning "Are you going to change your testimony today out of fear of him
today? So any- any attempt to argue that the Defense opened the door is disingenuous." (Trial
Tr. Vol. I, p.269, L.21 - p.270, L.2.) Defense counsel reminded the court that he had already
made a record that the defense did not want any witnesses referencing 404(b): "And here we are,
it wasn't a witness who referenced it, it was the State." (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.270, Ls.3-6.)
The district court ruled that the question asked by the prosecutor was 404(b) evidence,
but that the door was clearly opened by the defense's question and the witness's response. (Trial
Tr. Vol. I, p.272, L.24 - p.273, L.4.) The court ruled that the witness's response to defense
counsel's question "was entirely predictable, based upon the question that was asked." (Trial
Tr. Vol. I, p.273, Ls.4-8.) The court found that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by
asking the question, "[b ]ased upon the previous questions by Defendant's counsel to this witness,
I don't find that the conduct of [the prosecutor], in asking the question, is prejudicial." (Trial
Tr. Vol. I, p.273, Ls.21-25.) The court also found that the second question did not deprive
Mr. Jay of a fair trial, since no answer was given. 1 (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.273, L.25 - p.274, L.2.)
The court sustained the objection to the second question itself and ruled the second question
would not be answered, but declined to declare a mistrial. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.274, Ls.3-6.)
When the jury returned, the district court told them the following:

1

Although defense counsel objected before Ms. Wilder answered the question, the damage had
been done as the information was before the jury. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.266, Ls.10-14.) See
State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469 (2007) (holding that despite the fact that the witness
never answered the question, the Court nonetheless found that the jury "obviously understood
where the prosecuting attorney was going with his line of questioning.")
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All right. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I will give you an instruction
regarding the testimony as it was being given just prior to our recess. I will just
state, to the extent that you can remember the last question that was asked -- there
was not an answer given to it, but to the extent you can remember the last
question, that question was stricken, and you're to disregard it and not speculate
on any answer that might have been given.
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.277, L.17 - p.278, L.2.) In this case, however, a limiting instruction was
insufficient to cure the harm. As the Idaho Supreme Court has held:
The district court did give a limiting instruction to the jury against considering the
evidence as probative of Mr. Johnson's criminal propensity, and this instruction
surely helped mitigate the harmful effects of the error. Nonetheless, a limiting
instruction alone cannot always prevent an error from prejudicing the defendant.
See State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 229-31, 178 P.3d 28, 32-34 (2008) (finding a
404(b) error not to be harmless despite a limiting instruction).
State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 670 (2010).

By the time the prosecutor asked the damaging question, he had already successfully
challenged Ms. Wilder's credibility using her prior inconsistent statements-there was no need
to bring up the defendant's alleged prior bad acts; such information was irrelevant to whether
Mr. Jay struck Ms. Wilder that night. The prosecutor had asked the witness whether she had told
the officers that she was afraid of him the night of the incident. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.265, Ls.1-16.)
And Ms. Wilder agreed that, on the night of the incident, she was scared of Mr. Jay. (Trial
Tr. Vol. I, p.265, Ls.4-16.)

On cross-examination, Ms. Wilder was not asked, and did not

volunteer, information on past domestic batteries or assaults. The defense had not opened that
door.
In determining whether the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented
reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record, the reviewing court focuses on
"the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial
judge's refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively,
constituted reversible error." Johnson, 163 Idaho at 421.
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Because Ms. Wilder's credibility had already been successfully impeached, there was no
reason for the prosecutor to ask Ms. Wilder about statements she made to the officers regarding
Mr. Jay's alleged prior misconduct. As such, the evidence served only to allow the prosecution
to portray Mr. Jay as a criminal. Thus, admission of this evidence tended to work great, and
ongoing, prejudice on Mr. Jay's case, as this evidence necessarily would tend to imply that he
had a propensity to commit criminal offenses like the ones charged in this case. Accordingly, the
evidence was exceptionally and unfairly prejudicial (as well as irrelevant to whether Mr. Jay
committed the charged act), and it is clear that the district court abused its discretion by failing to
act consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it and by failing
to reach its decision by an exercise in reason. See Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856,
863 (2018).
Information that there had been multiple prior incidences of domestic violence inflicted
on Ms. Wilder by Mr. Jay was before the jury and the information continuously impacted the
trial. After hearing the prosecutor's question, the jury was unable to remove from its mind the
prosecutor's implication that Mr. Jay had struck Ms. Wilder three or four times before. Instead
of the jury deciding whether a crime was committed, the jury was asked to decide whether a
repeat offender who has previously committed a similar crime has repeated it.
Tr. Vol. I, p.269, Ls.8-15.)

(See Trial

The prosecutor's conduct in asking the 404(b) question was

extremely prejudicial, and forecast the prosecutor's misconduct during closing remarks-the last
thing the jury heard before it began its deliberations. (See Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.273, Ls.21-25.)
Although Mr. Jay moved for a mistrial after the prosecutor brought up Mr. Jay's alleged prior
bad acts in violation of I.R.E. 404(b ), the prosecutor's transgression did not end there. Instead,
the prosecutor used his closing argument to try to further improve his chances of winning.
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During closing statements the prosecutor repeatedly called on the jurors' sympathy for
the victim, and told the jury that they needed to ensure community safety by convicting Mr. Jay.
(Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.134, Ls.6-10.) For example, the prosecutor implored the jury:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, protect that woman. Protect Ms. Wilder.
Protect the community against a domestic violence abuser like Mr. Jay, and find
him guilty for his actions. Hold him accountable, and don't let him get away with
this.
(Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.134, Ls.6-10) (emphasis added.) The prosecutor was not asking the jury to
convict Mr. Jay because the State had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, but that it was
to convict Mr. Jay to make the community safer and because of their sympathy for the victim.
"[ A ]rgument for a conviction in order to protect the public and the rights of victims are outside
the boundaries of proper closing arguments." State v. Troutman, 148 Idaho 904, 909 (Ct. App.
2010).

It was misconduct for the prosecutor to place the duty to protect victim and the

community in the hands of the jury. Once again, the prosecutor waited until rebuttal closing to
tell the jury this, thereby ensuring that would be the last thing they heard before deliberations
began.
In yet another instance of prosecutorial misconduct (See Section II), the prosecutor told
the jury that the reason Mr. Jay did not plead guilty to resisting and/or obstructing the officers
was because it was part of the defense strategy, "defense wants you to go sit in that room and
stew over the felony domestic violence ... Let's split the baby and give the State the resisting."
(Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.136, L.14 -p.137, L.1.) Mr. Jay objected, but the district court overruled the
objection and the prosecutor continued, "They want you to split the baby King Solomon style.
Don't. Don't. He could have pleaded guilty to it, but he didn't. That defendant abused that
woman. Do her justice." (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.137, Ls.2-10.)
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Also during closing remarks (discussed in Section III), the prosecutor essentially testified
to the jury as if he were an expert in domestic violence-specifically, he told them that he has
personally seen victims deny that their spouse injured them, ''No, it is not unusual for a victim to
take that stand and deny everything that happened and say that she just loves her spouse so much
that she accidentally tripped and hit her face on a countertop. Every Friday, down the hall."
(Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.133, L.12 - p.134, L.2.) It was misconduct for the prosecutor to refer to facts
not in evidence by substituting his own, personal opinion as to a domestic violence victim's
version of the events.
The prosecutor's repeated and ongomg misconduct continuously impacted the trial.
Because the bulk of the misconduct occurred during the prosecutor's rebuttal closing remarks,
these improper remarks remained forefront in the minds of the jury when it left to deliberate. See
State v. Troutman, 148 Idaho 904, 909-10 (Ct. App. 2010) (placing importance on the fact that

the misconduct occurred in rebuttal argument, "[a]t this point in the trial the state has the last
word and is in a position to leave the last impression upon the jury"). Further, much of the
misconduct negatively affected the defense's theory of the case, thus harming Mr. Jay's ability to
present a defense. The prosecutor's question regarding alleged prior bad acts, and the plethora of
subsequent prosecutorial misconduct during closing remarks continuously impacted the trial to
Mr. Jay's detriment. The district court's refusal to declare a mistrial constituted reversible error.
See Johnson, 163 Idaho at 421.

15

II.
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct In Closing Arguments By Misstating And Disparaging
The Defense's Theory

A.

Introduction
Mr. Jay asserts that his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Fifth and the Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, was
violated when the prosecutor, in closing arguments, disparaged defense counsel and
misrepresented the defense's theory of the case. Mr. Jay asserts that the prosecutor's improper
closing arguments denied him a fair trial. Where these constitutional violations are clear from
the record, the State will be unable to demonstrate they were harmless. In light of these errors,
Mr. Jay respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand his
case for a new trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
Where a defendant alleges error at trial that he had contemporaneously objected to, the

reviewing court reviews the error on appeal under the harmless error test. State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 227 (2010). When the alleged error is prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must
first demonstrate that prosecutorial misconduct occurred, and the reviewing court then must
declare a belief beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct that occurred did not contribute
to the jury's verdict, in order to find that the error was harmless and not reversible. Id. at 227-28;

State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 59 (2011).

C.

The Prosecution Committed Misconduct When It Misstated And Disparaged The
Defense's Theory
During his closing statements, the prosecutor attacked the defense, telling the jury:
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I told you the defense wasn't going to stand up and argue the resisting arrest. Not
one argument about it. Why? If you look at your preliminary instructions -- look
at this. I want to bring this up to you because it's a strategic ploy by the defense,
and I want you to reject it.
Instructions Number 1 and 2 state the charges and which charges I brought, and it
says the defendant has pleaded not guilty to both. Interesting.
The defense wants you to go sit in that room and stew over the felony domestic
violence and say, "You know what? This is ugly. I don't know, dealing with
domestic violence is scary and gross. Let's split the baby and give the State the
resisting." That's why.
(Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.136, L.22 -p.137, L.1.) Mr. Jay objected, but the district court overruled the
objection and allowed the prosecutor to continue in this vein. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.137, Ls.2-5.)
The prosecutor then elaborated, "They want you to split the baby King Solomon style. Don't.
Don't. He could have pleaded guilty to it, but he didn't. That defendant abused that woman. Do
her justice." (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.137, Ls.7-10.)
The right to present a defense is protected by the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).

"This right is a fundamental

element of due process of law." Id. The right to present a defense includes the right to offer
testimony of witnesses, compel their attendance, and to present the defendant's version of the
facts "to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies." Id.
In State v. Page, the prosecutor made disparaging comments and engaged in personal
attacks on defense counsel during closing arguments to the jury. 135 Idaho 214, 223 (2000).
The prosecutor in Page told the jury that the defense attorney was playing "lawyer games, word
games," meaning that he was misusing words or putting them in people's mouths. Id. The Page
Court held, "It is misconduct for a prosecutor to disparage a defense attorney in closing
argument." Id.
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Closing argument should not include disparaging comments about opposing counsel's
argument. State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 290 (Ct. App. 2007). An attempt by the prosecutor
to distort and disparage the defense is plainly improper. State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 576
(Ct. App. 2007); Troutman, 148 Idaho at 909-10 (finding misconduct where the prosecutor
gravely distorted and mischaracterized the defense's theory).
The prosecutor's comments misrepresenting and disparaging the defense's theory of the
case violated Mr. Jay's right to a fair trial and his right to present a defense. The prosecutor was
not arguing that defense counsel's theory was not supported by the evidence, instead, the
prosecutor was arguing that defense counsel was modeling its defense of Mr. Jay on a Biblical
story, using an analogy purporting to be the defense's strategy. However, there was no evidence
which supported the prosecutor's obloquy-it was an unjustified claim by the prosecutor in his
attempt to discredit the defense's case. Such appeals to passions and prejudices encourages the
jurors to render a decision based on matters outside the evidence admitted at trial. See State v.
Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 942 (1994). When a prosecutor seeks "to secure a verdict on any factor
other than the law as set forth in the jury instruction and the evidence admitted during trial,
including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's
Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. The State will be unable
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct did not contribute to the jury's verdict.
Ellington, 151 Idaho at 59.
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III.
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct In Closing Arguments By Proffering His Own Opinion
On Domestic Violence Cases-Essentially Testifying As If He Were An Expert Witness

A.

Introduction
Mr. Jay asserts that his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Fifth and the Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, was
violated when the prosecutor, in closing arguments, proffered his own opinion on domestic
violence cases and whether alleged domestic violence victims will deny their significant other
caused their injuries.

Although unobjected-to, Mr. Jay asserts the misconduct meets the

fundamental error standard where the constitutional violations are clear from the record and
actually affected the trial's outcome. See State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 115, 119-20 (2019).

B.

Standard Of Review
A conviction will be set aside for unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct only if the

misconduct is sufficiently egregious to constitute fundamental error. State v. Parker, 157 Idaho
132, 141 (2014). For unobjected-to errors, the Court applies the fundamental error standard:
Such review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the defendant bears the burden of
persuading the appellate court that the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information
not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object
was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. The Idaho Supreme
Court recently clarified prongs two and three of this standard in Miller, 165 Idaho at 119-20. To
satisfy prong two, the Court held that the defendant must point to "evidence in the record" to
support the claim that trial counsel's failure to object was not a tactical decision. Id. 165 Idaho at
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119. To satisfy prong three, the Miller Court held that the defendant must demonstrate that the
clear error "actually affected the outcome of the trial proceedings." Id. 165 Idaho at 119-20.
Mr. Jay acknowledges that he did not contemporaneously object to the prosecutor's statements
testifying to the jury as to alleged victims and their testimony during domestic violence cases and
thus the statements must be evaluated for fundamental error.

C.

It Was Misconduct For The Prosecutor To, In Essence, Testify To The Jury As An Expert
Witness And To Tell Them His Opinions On Domestic Violence Cases

The prosecutor said the following, inter alia, in his rebuttal closing:
[Defense counsel] says it's unusual that they both testified it did not happen.
That's not unusual. Come down to the courthouse any time you want and watch
domestic violence cases and see how often a domestic violence victim takes the
stand and looks at the man who she has to live with and will probably live with
after and stares them in the eye and says, "Yeah, that's the man who beat me."
You come down and count how many of these victims you see.
No, it is not unusual for a victim to take that stand and deny everything that
happened and say that she just loves her spouse so much that she accidentally
tripped and hit her face on a countertop. Every Friday, down the hall.
What's unique about the case is that she made credible statements to a doctor and
a nurse who cared about her. And that's why we're here today. That's why this
case hasn't been dismissed.
(Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.133, L.12 - p.134, L.2.) The prosecutor was essentially testifying to the jury.
Instead of calling a domestic violence expert during his case-in-chief, the prosecutor essentially
testified to the jury as if he were an expert in domestic violence-specifically he told them that
victims often deny that their spouse injured them. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.133, Ls.12-23.) However,
it was misconduct for the prosecutor to refer to facts not in evidence by substituting his own,
personal opinion as to the typical behaviors and motives of a domestic violence victim.
"Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court, and that
they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their
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statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury than they
will give to counsel for the accused."

State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35,

, 71 P. 608, 611

(1903). The prosecutor's duty is to see that the defendant has a fair trial by presenting only
competent evidence and should avoid presenting evidence to prejudice the minds of the jury.

Id. The prosecutor must refrain from deceiving the jury by use of inappropriate inferences. Id.
As the Idaho Supreme Court noted, "As public officers, prosecutors have a duty to ensure
that defendants receive fair trials." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715 (2009). Thus "a
prosecutor must 'guard against anything that would prejudice the minds of the jurors, and tend to
hinder them from considering only the evidence introduced.' A prosecutor must also ensure that
the jury receives only competent evidence." Id. (quoting State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 44 (1903)).
As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "the prosecutor's opinion carries with
it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government's
judgment rather than its own view of the evidence." United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16-19
(1985); accord State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 110-11 (1979); State v. Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho
124, 131 (Ct. App. 1986). "[A] prosecuting attorney may express an opinion in argument as to
the truth or falsity of testimony or the guilt of the defendant when such opinion is based upon the
evidence," but he should "exercise caution to avoid interjecting his personal belief and should
explicitly state that the opinion is based solely on inferences from evidence presented at trial."

State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 n.1 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742,
753 n.1 (1991)).
A prosecutor may not base its closing argument on evidence not in the record. Phillips,
144 Idaho at 86; United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1321 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that it is
"definitely improper" for a prosecutor to make "unsupported factual claims" during closing). A
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prosecutor must also be careful to phrase the argument "in such a manner that it is clear to the
jury that [he or she] is summarizing evidence rather than inserting personal knowledge and
opinion into the case." United States v. Hermanek, 289 F.3d 1076, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Kerr, 981 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that a prosecutor has a "special

obligation to avoid improper suggestions and insinuations. A prosecutor has no business telling
the jury his individual impressions of the evidence. Because he is the sovereign's representative,
the jury may be misled into thinking his conclusions have been validated by the government's
investigatory apparatus"); United States v. McKay, 771 F.2d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir.1985) ("Even if
the jury did not understand the prosecutor to refer to his knowledge of facts outside the record,
the jury could have construed his statements of opinion as 'expert testimony' based on his
personal knowledge and his prior experience with other cases"). Further, lawyers are prohibited
from referring to facts that were never in evidence. See I.R.P.C. 3.4(e) See I.R.P.C. 3.4(e) ("A
lawyer shall not ... (e) in trial ... assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when
testifying as a witness or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a
witness ... or the guilt or innocence of an accused.")
Here, regrettably, the prosecutor's overall comments implied he was an authority on
domestic violence in the legal system and the ways of alleged domestic violence victims. While
testimony of this nature has been admitted during domestic battery trials, such testimony comes
in through an expert witness-someone with the qualifications to explain to the jury the "cycle
of violence" and not through the pontifications of a frustrated prosecutor during his rebuttal
closing remarks. See I.R.E. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
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in the form of an opinion or otherwise."); see also State v. Parton, 154 Idaho 558, 563 (2013)
(holding defendant did not show that the district court abused its discretion in permitting the
detective to testify as an expert on domestic violence). However, the prosecutor did not call an
expert witness to testify regarding the cycle of domestic violence at trial; instead, the prosecutor
told the jury during closing remarks that "it is not unusual for a victim to take that stand and
deny everything that happened and say that she just loves her spouse so much that she
accidentally tripped and hit her face on a countertop." (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.133, Ls.20-23.) The
prosecutor's remarks to the jury constituted misconduct.
Mr. Jay did not object to the prosecutor's improper arguments; however, he asserts that
the prosecutor's arguments amounts to fundamental error necessitating this Court to vacate his
conviction.

1.

The Prosecutor's Misconduct Violated Mr. Jay's Constitutional Rights

The United States Supreme Court has explicitly held that "the Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970). "Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set
forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth
Amendment right to a fair trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
Due process requires criminal trials to be fundamentally fair. Schwartzmiller v. Winters,
99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978). Prosecutorial misconduct may so unfairly contaminate the trial as to
make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.

Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765

(1987); State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318 (Ct. App. 2005). In order to constitute a due
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process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be of sufficient consequence to result in the
denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial. The touchstone of due process analysis in cases of
alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). The aim of due process is not the punishment of

society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Id.
It was misconduct for the prosecutor to proffer his own opinion on domestic violence

cases and victims in the court system.

Mr. Jay asserts that his due process right to a fair trial,

guaranteed by the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and
Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, was violated.

2.

The Error Is Clear From The Record Because The Record Shows The Failure To
Object Was Not Strategic Or Tactical

Next, this error is clear from the record. Mr. Jay has met his burden to show plain error
under Miller. The prosecutorial misconduct in this case is plain on its face, and there is no
reason to believe that Mr. Jay's counsel was "sandbagging" the district court by failing to object
to the prosecutor's testimony on what he has seen regarding the recanting of victims of alleged
domestic violence.

Not only is there is no legitimate strategic or tactical reason for defense

counsel to choose not to object to such evidence, evidence in the record demonstrates Mr. Jay's
counsel did not make a tactical decision not to object. The prosecutor talked to the jury about the
tendencies of alleged victims in domestic violence cases as if he was an expert witness. This
"expert testimony" was an attempt to refute the defense's theory of the case-that Ms. Wilder
lied to the officers and medical providers that night regarding the source of her injuries-which
defense counsel consistently proffered throughout trial. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.165, L.16 - p.170,
L.8 (emphasizing that Ms. Wilder would tell the truth at trial; her statements were made for the
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first time under oath); p.245, L.22 - p.246, L.18 (Ms. Wilder testifying on cross-examination that
she lied to law enforcement that night about the source of her injuries); p.24 7, L.16 - p.24 7, L.4
(Ms. Wilder testifying that she changed her position two weeks after the incident, after she
stopped taking painkillers); Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.118, Ls.1-22 (reminding the jury that both
eyewitnesses testified under oath that Mr. Jay did not strike Ms. Wilder); p.126, Ls.3-12 ("the
defense believes that she's finally telling the truth").)
The testimony elicited by the defense at trial was consistent with the arguments to the
jury made by defense counsel. This demonstrates it was not a tactical decision for the defense to
not object to the prosecutor's remarks, where the remarks undermined the defense's theory of the
case as well as the testimony it had elicited from the alleged victim, and the prosecutor's
opinions regarding the progress of domestic violence cases in the court system placed the
imprimatur of the State on this version. Therefore, under Miller, Mr. Jay has met his burden to
show the error plainly exists.

3.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Actually Affected The Trial's Outcome

Finally, the State's evidence against Mr. Jay was tenuous. The alleged victim,
Ms. Wilder, told the jury that she was intoxicated and fell, causing the bruising and injuries to
her face. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.242, L.23 - p.244, L.3; p.259, Ls.8-18.) The only evidence the
State had to prove that Mr. Jay was the source of Ms. Wilder's injuries was her prior
statements-made while she was intoxicated-to medical professionals and law enforcement.
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.251, Ls.3-12; p.307, L.22 - p.309, L.7; Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.7, Ls.5-13; p.18,
Ls.1-20; p.23, Ls.5-21.)
As such, this case came down to a credibility determination-did the jury believe the
alleged victim's out-of-court statements, or did the jury believe Mr. Jay's testimony that he was
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not the source of the injuries, and that he was unaware of Ms. Wilder's injuries when the officers
came to his home late that night? (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.45, Ls.1-3; p.46, Ls.1-25; p.50, Ls.22-25.)
As such, it is clearly improper that at closing arguments, the prosecutor told the jury his personal
opinion and experiences regarding the behavior of alleged victims and the progression of
domestic violence cases in court. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.133, L.12 - p.134, L.2.) The prosecutor's
proffers of his own opinion and experiences regarding domestic violence cases in the court
system surely contributed to the jury's guilty verdict. Therefore, Mr. Jay has shown the replete
prosecutorial misconduct actually affected the outcome of the trial. See Miller, 165 Idaho at 11920. He respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand his
case for a new trial.

IV.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Eight Years,
With Three Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Jay Following His Conviction For Felony Domestic Battery
Mr. Jay asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of eight years, with
three years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an
excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection
of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). In reviewing a trial
court's decision for an abuse of discretion, the relevant inquiry regards four factors:
Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
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Mr. Jay does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly,
in order to show the district court abused its discretion by failing to reach its decision by the
exercise of reason, Mr. Jay must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentences were
excessive considering any view of the facts. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997). The
governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2)
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility ofrehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, Mr. Jay's sentence is excessive
considering any view of the facts.
Mr. Jay has had an extremely traumatic event m his life recently.

Presentence

Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),2 pp.39, 44.) In April of 2018, his father passed away
from cancer. (PSI, p.39.) Mr. Jay was very close to his father, and when he found out his father
was dying, he started drinking. (PSI, p.39.) Mr. Jay drank heavily in 2018, after his father
passed away. (PSI, pp.39, 44.) Mr. Jay has struggled to deal with this, and is experiencing
severe depression. (PSI, pp.44, 51.) Mr. Jay has attempted suicide in the past and thought about
taking his own life in June of 2019, but though of his children and decided that he "didn't want
to do that to them." (PSI, pp.44, 50, 54-55.) Although Mr. Jay typically drank a six-pack ofbeer
a week, on the night of the incident he reported drinking a fifth of whiskey. (PSI, pp.51, 53, 64.)
Mr. Jay is aware that his alcohol use has created problems in his life. (PSI, p.44.) He has
stopped using alcohol and is 100% ready to remain abstinent. (PSI, p.56.) The Idaho Supreme
Court has held that substance abuse should be considered as a mitigating factor by the district

2

Appellant's use of the designation "PSI" includes the packet of documents grouped with the
electronic copy of the PSI, and the page numbers cited shall refer to the corresponding page of
the electronic file.
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court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982). Additionally, the
Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that ingestion of drugs and alcohol resulting in impaired capacity
to appreciate criminality of conduct, could be a mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102
Idaho 405, 414 (1981).
Mr. Jay has been diagnosed with major depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder. (PSI,
pp.43-44, 51.) He takes medication to help control his anxiety. (PSI, p.55.) The Idaho Supreme
Court has held that the trial court must consider a defendant's mental illness as a factor at
sentencing. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).
This offense is Mr. Jay's first felony conviction.

(PSI, pp.35-39, 48.)

The Idaho

Supreme Court has "recognized that the first offender should be accorded more lenient treatment
than the habitual criminal." State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting
State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94

Idaho 227 (1971)); see also State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982).
Mr. Jay does has an excellent work history.

He has been employed as a full-time

mechanic with the same company for over thirteen years. (PSI, p.42.) He is close to his family,
and he talks to his siblings several times a week. (PSI, p.40.) He has two children, and the
childrens' mother wrote a letter to the court in support of Mr. Jay. (PSI, p.79.) She told the
court that Mr. Jay is a very important figure in his young childrens' lives. (PSI, p. 79.) See
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who had the

support of his family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts).
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Jay asserts that the district court abused its
discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts that had the district court
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properly considered his willingness to seek treatment for his alcohol use, employment, mental
health conditions, and his family support, it would have imposed a less severe sentence.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Jay respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and remand this matter
for a new trial.
DATED this 11 th day of June, 2020.
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